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Abstract
This article brings the case of the Kurdish referendum for independence into the wider literature on
independence referendums. It examines the decision to hold an independence referendum and explores
the pre-referendum conditions and the post-referendum consequences. The article argues that the 
referendum in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq was held due to internal political competition and growing
rebellion from the population against the poor economic and political situation rather than the ripeness
of the timing for independence. Theoretically, this article adds a new dimension to the scholarship on 
independence referendums, as it demonstrates that the purposes of independence referendums can go
beyond the question put to the population - such as consolidating popular support by connecting to the
populations’ nationalist desires, despite independence not being a realistic prospect. Finally, it brings
further support for previous findings of the importance of international support for independence
referendums.
Keywords: Independence Referendums, Kurds, Iraq, Unrecognised states, 
Nationalism, Secession
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Introduction
The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) can be considered as a de facto state since the early 
1990s and its autonomy has only increased since the US invasion of Iraq in 2003;
however, full independence has remained illusive. In September, 2017, the Kurds held 
an independence referendum, which despite huge popular support came at a time of 
political, economic, and regional troubles and without the backing of the international
community or Baghdad. The conditions were thus far from ripe for such a radical move
and as a result, the Kurds are actually further from independence than any time since
2003. This article postulates that more than an actual bid for independent statehood, the
referendum was a way for the ruling party to reverse the trend of declining support and 
thus hold on to power, and improve its negotiating position within Iraq – a gamble, that
has paid off only partially.
Qvortrup argues that ‘referendums are increasingly becoming vehicles for political
change’ (Qvortrup, 2018a: 1). Indeed, considering the recent developments in 
Catalonia, New Caledonia and Bougainville, it can be argued that independence
referendums are becoming all the more popular worldwide. They can be used to achieve
independence – if successful and carried out with the host state’s support or by the host
state – or to take the steps that would launch negotiations for independence – if they 
are held by those seeking to secede (Collin, 2019). Additionally, independence
referendums can be used by de facto states to achieve recognition or to generate internal
legitimacy as a way to proceed with hard or soft statebuilding (Scheindlin, 2012: 66).
They can be held unilaterally by the de facto entity seeking to form a state, or they can 
be held after a bilateral agreement with the central government. Referendums can also 
serve symbolic purposes with no intention of declaring independence, or they can be
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used to provide political justification to secessionist claims and to galvanize consent
from the central government as well as the international community (Scheindlin, 2012:
66-67). 
The result of the 2017 referendum for independence of the KRI was overwhelmingly 
in favor of independence with 92.7 percent of the 3.3 million voting in favor with a 72
percent turnout (Sumer and Joseph, 2018: 6). Yet it neither led to independence nor 
launched negotiations on the matter, but instead led to a serious reduction in both 
autonomy and future possibilities of independence. As argued by Scheindlin (2012), 
sometimes, although political elites know that they are unlikely ‘to advance externally 
recognized sovereignty’, they still proceed with a popular vote in order to strengthen 
internal sovereignty (Scheindlin, 2012: 67). It then becomes imperative to ask what
were the motivations behind the KRI referendum and what were the desired 
consequences? In other words, what was the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)
hoping to achieve by holding a non-binding referendum for independence? Is it one of 
those cases where the referendum is used as a ‘statement of political intentions’ that
aims at revealing political goals that are half-baked or is it an example where the
referendum is a clear cut statement for self-determination (Scheindlin, 2012: 67)? In 
this article, we argue that it was neither and that the main reason behind the referendum
was for party gains within the internal political fight for power, making independence
a secondary notion. Consequently, this analysis introduces a new dimension to the
understanding of the use of independence referendums. 
In order to understand this new dimension, the article focuses on the conditions that led 
to the perceived political need for the referendum, the dynamics that led to the
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referendum’s failure, and the repercussions of the referendum, which are also linked to 
the lack of international support for independence. In this regard, we follow Lee and 
Mac Ginty’s (2013: 59) argument that the success or failure of any referendum depends
on the wider political context rather than the specific moment that the referendum is
held. Focusing on the broader political context in the KRI, this article argues that the
referendum was held due to internal political competition and growing rebellion from
the population against the poor economic and political situation rather than the ripeness
of the timing for independence. Previous studies clearly demonstrate that in the case of 
the lack of international support, political entities that seek independence might end up 
becoming an isolated unrecognized state, which in turn can lead to the conflict
becoming a protracted one (see Kolstø, 2006). In line with these arguments, this article
claims and demonstrates that if independence referendums are not backed by the central
government or the international community, they might not only worsen the situation 
by causing loss of already existing autonomy, but also decrease the chances of gaining 
independence in the foreseeable future. This article further argues that, in the case of 
the KRI, the idea behind the unofficial and non-binding referendum was also to 
negotiate a better deal with the Iraqi central government to ameliorate the pre-
referendum situation and potentially keep control of the territories gained in the fight
against the Islamic State (IS) by using the prospect of independence as a bargaining 
chip; however, this resulted in a significant political miscalculation that has seen much 
of the Kurdish gains since the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 reversed. The Kurdish vote
visibly revealed a great deal of support for independence and showed that many Kurds
desire independence as an ultimate political goal; however, the consequences of the
referendum also revealed the internal divisions among political parties in the KRI, lack 
of international support for Kurdish independence, and most importantly, the KRI’s
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dependence on Baghdad. Nonetheless, if, as this article argues, the leading reason for 
the referendum was for party gains, rather than Kurdish gains, in this regard the
referendum can at least be seen as a success. 
The cases of Scotland, Sudan, and Catalonia clearly point to the need for an urgent
academic commitment to provide a more thorough understanding of referendums and 
partition. As Qvortrup states, referendums were usually used in exceptional
circumstances; however, more recently countries are increasingly using ‘direct
democracy’ as a way to let out ‘political steam’ and, therefore, better legitimize the
political elites’ actions and systems (Qvortrup, 2018a: 15). In this regard, this article
also brings together the broader literature on independence referendums, and 
referendums more generally, in order to help further the understanding of the process, 
which is discussed next.
Referendums and Conflict Management: From Peace Settlements to Secession
There has been a significant interest in the use of referendums as a conflict management
and resolution tool in divided societies (Qvortrup, 2018b; McEvoy, 2018; Lee and Mac
Ginty, 2012; Mac Ginty, 2003) For instance, referendums were held in Burundi, 
Cyprus, Northern Ireland and South Africa to legitimize power-sharing pacts by 
popular vote (McEvoy, 2018: 865). Eritrea, Colombia, Cyprus and East Timor can be
given as examples of such cases where referendums were in one way or another 
perceived as tools for ending conflicts. In some cases, referendums are used for 
determining the status of a given territory, such as independence referendums, which 
determine whether the territory should become a sovereign independent state; and in 
some others to give a popular vote on specific aspects of a conflict resolution process
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such as peace settlement referendums (Amaral, 2018: 358). They, however, do not
always create the intended results as each case has its own peculiarities. For instance, 
in the case of Colombia, the referendum over the peace process actually delayed peace
(Gomez-Suarez, 2017) while in the cases of South Africa and Northern Ireland 
referendums ended conflicts peacefully (Lee and Mac Ginty, 2012: 44). Referendums
can also be used to establish new states, revising constitutions or creating new ones as
well as for establishing sub-autonomy (McEvoy, 2018: 865). The cases of New
Caledonia and Bougainville are the most recent examples to demonstrate the power of 
referendums in creating new states (Collin, 2019: 139; Qvortrup 2018b). Furthermore, 
it can be said that by defining a certain territory and a people who belong to that place, 
referendums play a vital role in nation-building (Tierney, 2012: 366). 
Lee and Mac Ginty (2012) argue that the jury is still out whether referendums can be
considered a cure for the resolution of ethnonational conflicts. As much as it has the
potential to end conflicts, a referendum can also trigger violence and create a vicious
cycle of competition for power. Mac Ginty (2003: 3) has previously argued that
referendums in profound ethnonationalist conflicts actually create losers and winners, 
resulting in zero-sum outcomes. In Collin’s (2019: 139) words, referendums are
‘flashpoints for electoral violence, freezing of conflict and returns to war.’ The cases of 
East Timor and South Sudan are examples of how referendums can trigger the
escalation of violence rather than mitigating conflict (Levy et al., 2018: 8), whilst the 
referendum in Bougainville, on the other hand, successfully mitigated the conflict
(Levy et al., 2018: 39). In addition, Qvortrup (2018b; 3) underlines that scholars are
skeptical when it comes to utilizing referenda to resolve issues that create major 
cleavages in society. Despite all this criticism, Qvortrup (2018b; 4) suggests that not all
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referendums are bearers of bad news. He suggests that if the conditions allow, for 
instance in the case of the presence of international support and consent from both sides
of the conflict involved, referenda are more likely to be successful. In the cases of 
Northern Ireland and Montenegro, for instance, pre-negotiated settlements and both 
sides implementing their parts mentioned in agreed guidelines brought an end to 
conflict. Lee and Mac Ginty (2012: 44), in this regard, urge caution in utilization of 
referendums in conflicts and argue, ‘the circumstances in which a referendum is held 
are the key to whether a referendum can be deemed a conflict amelioration tool.’ They 
add that ‘referendums in South Africa, Northern Ireland and southern Sudan were
pushing at doors that were already open’ (Ibid: 44) and the results might not be the
same for cases that follow. As Levy et al. (2018: 8) argue, ‘even if violence does not
occur, the spirit in which a referendum is conducted can have an important bearing on 
the spirit in which it is implemented.’ Therefore, the process that makes up the prelude
to the referendum matters as much as the referendum itself. In this respect, 
‘referendums held before a settlement has been reached are often unproductive and at
worst dangerous’ (Qvortrup, 2018b: 4) and a successful referendum can more often 
than not be ‘politically constructed’ with pre-negotiation phases (Lee and Mac Ginty, 
2012: 45). This is a particularly important point to highlight with regards to the
referendum in the KRI, where no settlement was reached with Baghdad and the
referendum was seen to precede rather than follow negotiations. 
It is also important to note that ‘standard referendum campaigns often merely amplify 
the voices of contending and entrenched political parties and elites’ (Levy et al., 2018:
7). Although conflicts are multi-layered with multiple actors with diverging interests, 
a single question asked at a referendum to solve highly complex issues usually 
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suppresses the voices of people who are open to more moderate solutions (Mac Ginty, 
2003: 3). At the same time, uniting around a cause and homogenizing variety might
become a necessity for both sides to strengthen their fronts, which eventually creates
more room for intra and inter-group competition within a given conflict (Ibid). 
Independence Referendums and Contested Sovereignty
As Mac Ginty (2003: 3) notes, ‘the utility of referendums becomes infinitely more
complex in situations of ethnonational conflict, particularly if deployed in relation to 
territorial or sovereignty issues.’ Nevertheless, increasingly political elites who support
self-determination demand central governments to hold referendums, as it is believed 
that ‘referendums reveal the views of the people in a direct manner’ and ‘epitomize
popular sovereignty’ (Guibernau et al., 2013: 1). Therefore, they create legitimacy for 
secession and make a powerful statement with regards to popular will and direct
democracy. As Qvortrup’s (2018b: 1) research shows, ‘previously referendums on 
independence have been held in over 50 cases’. In some of these cases referendums
were held following a negotiated settlement but in others there were no agreements
between the conflicting parties. Most of these referendums were held in ‘under less than 
ideal conditions and in countries with less than impressive track records of free and fair 
elections’ (Qvortrup, 2013: 5). When it comes to the consequences of independence
referendums, central states rarely agree with the results (Cetra and Harvey, 2018: 18;
Qvortrup, 2013: 5) and this happens not only in non-democratic contexts but in 
democratic countries too (Qvortrup, 2013: 6). The case of Catalonia and the reaction of
the Spanish government, for instance, are a testimony to the above (Cetra and Harvey, 
2018). Nevertheless, civil war or unrest does not always occur after independence
referendums; indeed in many cases secession has also been achieved through a 
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‘peaceful political divorce’ (Qvortrup, 2014: 61). Additionally, as in the case of 
Quebec, Scotland or New Caledonia, the results of independence referendums might
not favor secessionists (Collin, 2019; Guibernau et al., 2013). 
We are particularly interested in cases where a certain territory has been given 
autonomy with a prospect of an independence referendum when the dust of the conflict
settles. In such cases where a deferred independence referendum (officially or 
unofficially) becomes part of the conflict resolution process, ‘secessionists often 
demand referendums on independence, and the deferral gives states opportunities to 
prepare and persuade voters to opt to remain’ (Collin, 2019: 139). Cetra and Harvey 
(2018) demonstrate that states mostly allow independence referendums when they have
strategic interests in it and when they are confident that the referendums will not result
in partition. In other cases where states feared threats to their territorial integrity, they 
blocked these referendums from happening as in the cases of Iraq (with the disputed 
territories) and Western Sahara (Collin, 2019: 142). The possibility of holding a
referendum for independence then might derail conflict resolution efforts in the long 
run. Furthermore, there might be two problems with peace plans that include
independence referendums ahead: internal problems within the territory that is to be
separated, such as South Sudan; and the tensions between the territory and the central
state, for example Iraq, the KRI and the disputed territories (Collin, 2019). 
With regards to international recognition of referendums, the crux of the matter lies at
the unilateral or bilateral nature of referendums. According to Qvortrup (2018b: 6), 
unilateral independence referendums constituted the majority since the 1980s and only 
in a few cases the referendum resulted in recognition of the new state by the
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international community. He specifically underlines that the three ‘democratic’ 
permanent members of the UN Security Council play a critical role in terms of 
international recognition of new states (Qvortrup, 2018b: 12). 
In the light of these discussions, there are several aspects that are relevant to the analysis
of the KRI case. Firstly, the referendum was not part of a negotiated settlement and it
was put forward unilaterally by the Kurdish side. Secondly, the referendum was not
held ‘in good spirit’ with political battles between the KRG and Baghdad, Turkey and 
Iran. Thirdly, the KRG did not intend to declare independence straight away, but instead
aimed to increase its bargaining power with the central government in Baghdad. 
Finally, the international community was not supportive of the referendum regardless
of its non-binding result. Despite some commonalities, the KRI case is also 
distinguishable from recent independence referendums such as the Catalan or Scottish 
cases. First of all, the recent history between the KRI and Baghdad is marred by 
authoritarianism and oppression of Kurdish nationalism and self-determination. Spain, 
for instance, has a democratic government and scholars argue that Catalonia’s
referendum was extra-constitutional from a purely legal perspective (Qvortrup, 2018b: 
11). Moreover, hostile neighbors who want to curb its ascending power surround the
KRI and without consent from both regional and international actors, independence is
an unattainable task, an issue that is discussed next. 
The International Community, Secessionist Movements and Independence
Referendums
Ethnic wars between an incumbent government and ethnic challengers can be
distinguished according to the goals of the insurgents: whether they want to replace the
10 
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existing government with a new regime, or to create a new sovereign nation-state or 
autonomous region out of a portion of the existing one (see Mason and Fett, 1996). 
Ethnonational conflicts ‘whose protagonists aim at establishing a new ethnic state or 
autonomous region … are among the most-deadly and protracted of all ethnopolitical
conflicts’ (Gurr, 2000: 276).1 Western governments are still very much ambivalent
when it comes to supporting partition to end civil wars (Johnson, 2008). At the
normative level, there is a clash between respecting territorial integrity of nation states
and acknowledging the right to self-determination. This could to a certain extent
explain the ambiguous approach of the international community to various conflicts
such as Nagorno-Karabakh or Catalonia today. It can be argued that changing borders
in order to settle conflicts might seem too messy for the international actors as
successful secession might trigger others to demand the same and in most cases, this
does not happen without a violent conflict. Partition and separation are hence seen as a
last resort to solve the ‘most intense ethnic conflicts’ (Kaufmann, 1998: 120). 
Secessionist claims to statehood can often be placated with much less, including 
regional autonomy, federalism and power-sharing at the center. A generous offer for 
autonomy might prevent the political entity seeking secession to settle and drop its
demands (Cederman et.al, 2015). In reality, however, there is always a chance that the
situation might regress with the change of leadership, shift in geopolitical balances as
well as with the new opportunities that might arise, for instance, if the base state
becomes weaker (see Li, 2002; Cederman et.al, 2015). In some cases, the political entity 
that demands secession might look for ways to legitimize its demands and holding 
referendums in favor of partition can give a clear mandate for independence. This
situation creates a complexity for the international community: ‘recognizing a
11 
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referendum may be a prelude to recognizing the state’ (Scheindlin, 2012:79) and not
recognizing it might worsen the conflict situation and cause escalation of war. As we
have seen in the KRI case; however, a referendum in favor of independence does not
automatically translate into a declaration of independence.
Figure 1. The Secessionist Continuum
Source: Voller (2014:15)
Voller (2014: 15) explains how one can imagine a secessionist continuum that starts
with the liberation struggle of a certain community and ends with independence as a
recognized state (Figure 1). In this continuum, becoming a de facto state is between 
these two ends and entails certain autonomy from the central government, but the lack 
of domestic and international recognition as a sovereign state. The contested 
sovereignty issues might in the end lead to a peaceful and successful transition to the
latter or they might keep causing conflict until there is a regression and a backward 
movement on the continuum. 
Quasi-states like the KRI, which have a degree of de facto independence but have not
declared independence, have a tendency to survive for a long time (Kolstø, 2006). They 
stay in this limbo situation while functioning relatively well and continuing with a state
12 
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and nation-building process in the meantime. They form state-like institutions, separate
judiciary, police and health systems and even an army that operates under their rule. 
The limits of their progress, nevertheless, rely on their dependencies on the economic
aid and political support from the international community, their base state’s attitude
towards their development and, finally, the patron states’ (if any exist) approach 
towards them (Caspersen, 2013). Since the early 1990s the KRG also engaged in nation 
and state-building processes hoping to move towards the ultimate goal in the
secessionist continuum (Voller, 2014), and, as argued in this article, it made a
miscalculated move, or a move for reasons other than independence, which in the end 
caused it to regress towards the other end of the continuum.
The Kurds and De Facto Statehood
The KRI has been referred to as a de facto state by academics and experts due to its
special status within the borders of Iraq (Voller, 2014; Soguk, 2015). Authors such as
Nina Caspersen (2013), for instance, define the KRI’s status as a case of ‘incremental
secession’: an entity that has not declared independence but functions independently 
and displays aspirations for statehood. The KRI gained an autonomous status in the
early 1990s – which was interrupted by a civil war between the two main Kurdish 
political parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic
Party (KDP), from 1994 to 1997 – and turned into a ‘quintessential de facto state’ after 
the US-led invasion of Iraq (Voller, 2014: 12). The KRI has its own parliament and an 
independently functioning judiciary; moreover, it has more than a dozen diplomatic
representations around the world, which act like de facto embassies. It has its own 
international airport and the capital, Erbil, hosts numerous international representations
that carry diplomatic relations with the KRG. At the same time, authors such as Soguk 
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(2015: 959) argue that the ‘KRG appears to defy the conventional trajectory definitive
of state-building in the post-colonial era in that it is empirically emerging as a sovereign 
without constitutionally seeking recognition as a sovereign’. Kurdish aspirations for 
statehood, however, have never been a secret. On the contrary, many Kurdish 
movements have tried to achieve independence and rebelled against sovereigns and 
states over the last two centuries (Park, 2018; Soguk, 2015). What is different about the
KRG is that they cooperated, at different levels, with the Iraqi central government in 
Baghdad for a decade, postponing these aspirations due to strategic disablers in the way 
of independence. The KRG, on the surface at least, seemed to have accepted its status
as a quasi-state since 2003 and continued its para-diplomacy efforts within the realms
of the political and economic space that it carved for itself despite its landlocked 
territorial situation and the geopolitical dynamics of its position within the Middle East. 
As Natali (2015) argues, an autonomous KRG was a by-product of failed Iraqi-
statebuilding policies and it has gradually evolved into a quasi-state. In post-Saddam
Iraq, the KRI has advanced in many areas including economically and politically. Due
to the dynamics created by the no-fly-zone following the first Gulf War, Kurds were in 
a strong position to act as allies during the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 and managed 
to negotiate for an autonomous region within the 2005 Iraqi constitution, as well as
being able to attract significant economic investment (Berwari and Ambrosio, 2008;
Jüde, 2017). The Iraqi constitution of 2005 gave the Kurds the rights to form their own 
parliament, appoint their own President and Prime Minister, as well as giving them
control of their territorial borders and a representation in Baghdad (Sumer and Joseph, 
2018: 2). The relative stability in the KRI, the opening up of the markets, the
exportation of hydrocarbons, and the international presence resulted in an economic
14 
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boom in the KRI in the 2000s. For example, the economic growth rate between 2004 
and 2009 varied between 8 and 25 percent (Jüde, 2017: 853). The KRG also managed 
to establish good relations with its neighbors including Iran and Turkey and made them
its largest trade partners since it was aware that it was inevitably dependent on these
countries to survive economically and politically. As these relations developed, 
however, the relationship between the central government and the KRG started 
deteriorating following disputes over the situation of Kirkuk, oil related issues, the
payment of the Peshmerga – the Kurdish army – and the budget. This deterioration, 
combined with the internal power struggles and economic crisis, resulted in calls for 
independence via referendum being brought back to the political agenda (Smith and 
Shadarevian, 2017:4). 
Intricacies of State-building in the KRI: Economy, Internal Divisions, and the
Referendum
Kolstø and Blakkisrud (2008: 484) define statebuilding as:
the establishment of the administrative, economic, and military groundwork of functional 
states. It includes the establishment of frontier control, securing a monopoly of coercive
powers on the state territory, and putting into place a system for the collection of taxes and
tolls. 
According to the authors, these are the ‘hard aspects’ of constructing new states. When 
it comes to the ‘soft aspects’, they list ‘construction of a shared identity and a sense of 
unity in a state’s population, through education, propaganda, ideology, and state
symbols’ as crucial for a nation-building project that lies at the core of state-building
(Kolstø and Blakkisrud, 2008: 484). In the case of KRI, the political elites managed to 
establish border control, secured monopoly of coercive powers within the territories of 
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the Kurdish autonomous region – despite the division between separate Peshmerga
forces controlled by the KDP and the PUK – and built institutions that control the
judiciary and other state mechanisms under the sovereignty of an elected parliament. 
The KRI, nonetheless, remained separated between two geographic regions controlled 
by the KDP and PUK (Sumer and Joseph, 2018). With regards to the soft aspects of 
statebuilding, the Kurdish national movement has managed to unite Kurds around a
nationalist project with distinct cultural and linguistic boundaries that separated the
Kurds from the rest of the Iraqi population. Nevertheless, although a shared national
project has been created, a unified Kurdish identity has not, and divisions based on the
ideologies of the Kurdish nation remain considerable.
Taking Kolstø and Blakkisrud’s definition as the basis, one can argue that the KRI has
managed to a certain extent to launch state and nation-building projects simultaneously. 
‘The societal, ethnic and political distinctions between the two regions are considerable, 
and the Iraqi federal government has little, if any, effect on the laws, politics and 
popular freedoms of the KRI’ (Smith and Shadarevian, 2017: 4). One can observe, 
however, two main weaknesses that will prevent the KRG political elites from going 
further in these projects: a) economic dependence and b) internal divisions, which are
also interlinked with democratization in the KRI.
The early economic status of the KRI, despite its dependence on the oil revenues
allocated via the central government in Baghdad, was relatively successful. As the KRI 
is a landlocked entity, however, its economy is not only dependent on the funds coming 
from the central government, but also its neighbors for access to trade routes (Sumer 
and Joseph, 2018). Kurdish desires for more autonomy resulted in them seeking to 
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develop their own independent hydrocarbon exportation, which created significant
strains on relations with Baghdad. Nonetheless, the liberalization and opening of 
hydrocarbon fields allowed the KRG to negotiate public and private partnerships with 
production sharing agreements (Kuruuzum, 2017). With the high oil price between 
2007 and 2014, the economic position allowed in the KRG to offset their strained 
relations with the central government, which resulted in them not receiving its
budgetary allocation (O’Driscoll, 2017). Instead of diversifying the economy away 
from its reliance on hydrocarbons and developing the private sector – two ways in 
which future economic viability of the state could be ensured – these finances were
largely used to strengthen the two leading political parties’ patronage system. 
Moreover, corruption has also been a drain on public finances and has not been properly 
addressed (O’Driscoll, 2016). Thus, when the economy crashed at the end of 2014, the
KRG was not in a position to tackle the situation. The KRG employs roughly 60 percent
of the working population in the KRI with a monthly wage bill of between $700-800 
million. This is only sustainable when oil sells for over $100 a barrel, which is
something that is unlikely to be achieved again. Additionally, the KRG has amassed 
substantial debts – estimated between $19 billion (O’Driscoll, 2016) and $22 billion 
(Natali, 2015: 153). In response to the oil price drop and the resultant crisis, the KRG
significantly reduced salaries and also missed several months’ payments altogether. 
With patronage playing an important part in politics in the KRI (Friedman, 2016), the
reduction and nonpayment of salaries was a major issue for the political elite. This was
particularly the case, as for the first time since the establishment of the KRI, grassroots
members of the KDP were questioning the leadership and protest movements were
growing.2 Thus, the elites attempted to shift blame on to Baghdad, and its nonpayment
of the budget, as well as the war against IS and the strain from the resulting Internally 
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Displaced People (IDPs); however, the KRG shares in the blame for the breakdown in 
negotiations on the budget, as it chose the path of developing its own independent
hydrocarbon economy. Moreover, although the conflict against IS (and repercussions
thereof) have negatively impacted the KRI, it is not responsible for the financial crisis
and has also resulted in much- needed finances entering the local economy through 
international NGOs, IDPs’ state salaries and savings, and the US government’s
financing of the Peshmerga (O’Driscoll, 2016).3 
One of the paths towards independence is for unrecognized states to carry out
democratization processes in order to increase international support. The need to 
maintain unity in order to achieve the goal of independence, however, is often at odds
with the democratization process (Caspersen, 2011). As a result of this need for unity, 
democratization in the KRI stagnated, as the KDP and the PUK attempted to protect
unity and their political hegemony. This resulted in the formation of a new political
party, Gorran,4 which launched with a campaign to tackle corruption and what is
effectively the two-family political system of the KDP and the PUK (Hama and Jasim, 
2017). As politics in the KRI started to move away from the two-party territorial-based 
system, pressure on the KDP and PUK increased. The impact of Gorran and its
manifesto against nepotism and clientelism, nonetheless, has actually led to more
undemocratic actions from the political elites, as they have acted against Gorran in 
order to maintain political power (O’Driscoll, 2016). 
Masoud Barzani’s second term as President ended in 2013; however, he was granted a
two-year extension by the parliament.5 In 2015 when this extension ended, the KDP
attempted to extend his term once more, but Gorran rejected this. In Sulaymaniyah,
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there were protests calling for Barzani to resign and KDP offices were attacked, 
resulting in the death of five people. The KDP blamed these actions on Gorran and thus
prevented the Speaker of the Parliament (a Gorran party member) from entering Erbil, 
which technically led to the suspension of the parliament. Further undemocratic
measures followed when the KDP excluded the five Gorran ministers from the
cabinet. Consequently, after October, 2015 the KRI was governed without a parliament, 
or a representative cabinet, and Barzani acted as President despite his term having 
ended. As a result, the traditional political elites within the KDP and PUK once again 
controlled governance in the KRI (O’Driscoll, 2016). 
In May 2016, however, Gorran and the PUK reached an agreement for partnership, 
which in turn threatened KDP’s political dominance. With a combined 42 seats (out of 
111), a coalition of Gorran and the PUK, based on the previous election, would have
four more seats than the KDP, thus endangering the KDP’s long-held hegemonic
position of power in the government (Salih, 2016). This forced Barzani and the KDP’s
hand and growing desperation to maintain power led to Barzani announcing the
referendum for independence – despite the fact that the conditions were far from ideal, 
with the poor economic and political situation, lack of international support, and no 
support from neighboring countries or Baghdad (Kaplan, 2018). On 07 June 2017,
Barzani announced that the referendum (that was to include Kirkuk and other disputed 
territories) would take place on 25 September 2017. 
Within the framework of this Special Issue, Kurdish elites utilized ethnic nationalism, 
as Kurdish identity, history, and homeland were constantly referred to within the
nationalist rhetoric during the referendum campaign. Nonetheless, Barzani and the
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KDP did, at times, attempt to portray to the international community a sense of civic
identity and civic nationalism in order to gain support for the independence campaign. 
For example, Barzani mentioned changing the flag and anthem to represent all the
communities within the KRI (Ali, 2017). Most of the campaigning for the referendum, 
however, focused on Kurdish identity and how Kurds have historically been denied the
right to a nation-state. Civic nationalism can thus be said to have been purely for 
consumption by the international community where it maintains some legitimacy as
opposed to ethnic nationalism, which is seen as unpalatable (Smith, 2010). What is
crucial here is that the referendum, and the ethnic nationalist sentiments that surround 
it, were utilized by the KDP for political party gains rather than for independence. 
Barzani’s nationalist rhetoric surrounding the referendum for independence sought to 
create a vision that the Kurds’ time had finally come and that only he and the KDP
could deliver the ultimate goal of independence. Through ethnic nationalism and the
Kurdish desire for an independent state, Barzani focused on shared suffering, historical
grievances, and the ‘failed Iraqi state’ in an attempt to maintain power. As the campaign 
went on, many Kurds began to believe independence was achievable and criticisms of 
the political and financial situation began to ease. 
The referendum was led by Barzani and not the KRG parliament or Baghdad and did 
not have the support of all Kurdish parties. The economic position of the KRI, and the
lack of possibility of financing a state, made independence unviable. Due to the KRI 
being landlocked, support of at least one of the neighboring states is intrinsic to its
economic and physical survival, with Iran and Turkey controlling the water supply 
entering the KRI. Therefore, as the Iraqi central government will not likely relinquish 
its sovereignty over the KRI with or without a referendum, external recognition and the
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support of the international community is vital for statehood – not only for its creation,
but also for development and sustainability (Caspersen, 2013). Thus, a significant
aspect of the failed referendum is, that apart from Israel, no other international actor 
backed it (Sumer and Joseph, 2018). 
Moreover, in the case of the KRI, it is hard to imagine that the referendum was held 
with the aim of reaching the final stage in the continuum as suggested by Voller (2014). 
As argued above, the referendum was called for political survival, rather than due to 
favorable conditions, which goes some way to explaining the fallout following the
results. Additionally, this brings a new dimension to the understanding of the use of
referendums, and independence referendums specifically, as the question that the
referendum posed was not the true the purpose of the referendum. Rather, a political
party facing threats to its position of power used the referendum as a political tool to 
maintain power. In short, it was to win the support of the people, rather than actual
independence. It would however be unfair to say that Kurdish independence is not a
goal for Barzani, despite the instrumentalization of the referendum for political gains. 
Nonetheless, the referendum has brought him, and the Kurds, further from their goal. 
The Fallout of the Referendum
Theoretically this article has laid out the types of referendums and the conditions, which 
the KRI did not meet, for success, such as internal dynamics, timing, international
backing, and host state support. It has demonstrated the reason why the referendum
went ahead despite not meeting the key conditions and now the repercussions will be
discussed. 
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The aim of the referendum was for Barzani and the KDP to maintain their position of 
power within the KRI in light of the threats faced due to the financial and political crisis
(Hiltermann, 2017b). Although with regards to internal power this was a successful
tactic, as Barzani and the KDP managed to prevent the PUK and Gorran from politically 
sidelining them, this came with significant loss to the extent of the power wielded 
(Kaplan, 2018). Barzani and many others, completely underestimated Baghdad’s
response to the referendum and the KDP’s gains came at the price of the extent of 
Kurdish autonomy (Park, 2018). 
Despite the referendum being for party gains, there was at least an expectation from
Barzani that the referendum results would at a minimum put him and his party in a
better position when negotiating further autonomy, budgets, and the financing of the
Peshmerga with Baghdad. This misreading of the situation proved catastrophic for the
Kurds. Following the success of the campaign against IS, Prime Minister Haider al-
Abadi (2014-2018) utilized his popularity, the growing strength of the Iraqi army, and 
the international community’s vocalized support for maintaining the territorial integrity 
of Iraq, to address gains made by the Kurds during IS’ reign. Firstly, in October, 2017 
Abadi sent in the Iraqi army and the Popular Mobilization Forces to take control of 
Kirkuk and other disputed territories, as well as the oil fields within them. Due to a deal
for the withdrawal of the majority of the PUK Peshmerga between Baghdad and some
factions within the PUK, the taking of control of Kirkuk by Baghdad was relatively 
easy and there was minimal fighting. Secondly, Abadi took control of border posts and 
airports in the KRI, seriously weakening the KRG’s income generating capabilities. 
Essentially the Kurds lost all the gains they made since 2003 and went from a relatively 
strong negotiating position with Baghdad prior to the referendum to a position of 
22 
  
 
 
  
        
         
         
     
        
          
    
       
       
          
 
 
       
         
      
   
      
          
       
        
      
        
        
       
Accepted Version March 2019
Forthcoming in International Political Science Review
weakness, which has been compounded by internal Kurdish division (Hiltermann, 
2017a). Moreover, the loss of the oil fields resulted in Kurds almost halving their oil
production, which is considerable even without the large amount of debt and the fact
that some of the oil has been paid for ahead of time (Rivlin, 2017). Abadi also ordered 
the auditing of the KRG’s payroll and Baghdad began paying Kurdish salaries, further 
undermining the KDP. As a result of the referendum, the political power that Kurdish 
politicians have is less than was available prior to the referendum, as Kurds have seen 
the territory they control diminish, their hydrocarbon exportation capabilities reduced,
and their ability to gain income from the borders curtailed (van den Toorn, 2018). The
Kurdish case follows the arguments of Levy et al. (2018) and Lee and Mac Ginty (2012) 
in that if the conditions are not right for a referendum, violence (in the military taking 
control of Kirkuk) and a battle for power will occur.
Following the referendum the protest movement in the KRI also grew with anti-
corruption and anti-establishment at the core of its agenda. The new political parties,
the Coalition for Democracy and Justice (CDJ) and the New Generation Movement,
utilized this in their more Baghdad-friendly approach focusing on ending corruption, 
breaking nepotism in the KRI and paying civil servants. The protest movement clearly 
shows that the political elites who form the KRG need to deal with internal issues, 
which have grown as a result of the referendum. Nonetheless, when it came to the 2018 
national elections Kurdish apathy toward the political system was clear, as nothing had 
changed with regards to the political control and corruption, and the referendum (which 
in the end was supported by most political parties) was fruitless. In the elections, the
turnout was almost 30 percent lower than the previous two national elections in 2010 
and 2014. This low turnout greatly benefited the KDP, and to a certain extent the PUK, 
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as they have a core patronage-based voter base. The KDP managed to maintain its 25 
seats, whereas, despite its perceived abandonment of Kirkuk, the PUK lost only three
seats leaving it with 18. Due to voter apathy, the new political opposition parties did 
not perform well and the seats they did win came at the cost of other opposition parties, 
mainly Gorran (Dodge et al., 2018). Therefore, although the Kurds have lost power, 
the KDP has maintained their position, which was one of the main motives behind the
referendum.
The repercussions of the referendum have also resulted in the KRI moving a step back 
in the secession continuum (Voller, 2014). Instead of moving towards independence, 
the KRG now has to face issues related to power-sharing in Iraq, settlement of the
disputed territories, and distribution of economic revenues before it can even consider 
negotiating on the mandate for independence that it has received from the Kurdish 
people in the referendum. Nonetheless, it is unlikely the Kurds are going to find 
themselves in the position to negotiate for independence with the recent losses and the
international and regional dynamics against independence. As Sumer and Joseph (2018:
2) demonstrate, ‘oil and gas sales from the KRI are done through Turkey while
commercial activities and consumables are gained through investment and trade with 
Iran, Turkey and federal Iraq.’ The KRG’s aspirations for statehood disturb this delicate
balance in the region that is constructed on contingent economic interests. Therefore, 
the KRG needs to overcome its economic reliance on its neighbors in order to surpass
the paradox that it is currently facing, which makes it a choice between independence
and economic collapse (Sumer and Joseph, 2018). 
Conclusion
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Today, the KRI can still be considered an unrecognized state that maintains its 
‘incremental secessionist’ attitude. The referendum, however, has had consequences
with regards to KRI’s mobility towards the independence end of the secessionist
continuum (Voller, 2014). The current domestic and international political tensions
combined with the economic situation within the KRI create a paradoxical situation for 
the Kurdish elites to deliver the referendum results. 
The dynamics for independence were not ideal when the referendum was called;
however, Barzani and the KDP’s hegemonic grip on power was under threat and a
calculated risk was taken. The expected result was to maintain power within the KRI 
in the short term and then to negotiate for more autonomy from Baghdad, which could 
be presented as a gain to the population. The repercussions of the referendum have
taken the Kurds further away from independence than they have been at any point since
2003 and have in fact reduced Kurdish autonomy. The dynamics of the defeat of IS and 
Abadi’s popularity played an important role; however, the lack of international support
or support from the Iraqi parliament contributed to the referendum being viewed as a
threat and a threat that needed to be dealt with harshly. As a result, Abadi was able to 
push back against the increasing power gains of the Kurds. 
This article demonstrates the importance of international support for any independence 
referendum, as without such support, the referendum is likely to lead to a loss, rather 
than a gain, of autonomy – particularly if the international community comes out
strongly in favor of maintaining the territorial integrity of the state. Moreover, it
demonstrates the importance of timing, the nature in which the referendum is
conducted, and the importance of good dialogue with the host state prior to the
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referendum. Most importantly this article demonstrates that independence referendums
do not actually have to be for the purpose of the question put to the population, but
rather can be used as a political tool to gain popular support by connecting to the
populations’ nationalist desires, despite independence not being a realistic prospect.
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Notes
1 Although there are exceptions such as Quebec, Slovenia, Macedonia etc.
 2 In conversations with one of the authors in 2016, traditional KDP members voiced their	
concerns	 and openly criticised the role of the KDP in the economic	 situation.
 3 This is not to undermine the strain	 that the war against IS and resulting dynamics did place on	
the KRI.
 4 The Gorran	 Movement is considered the	 first real opposition movement in the	 Kurdish political	
sphere.
5 Previous elections were held	 in	 2005	 and	 2009.
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